Yeongjin Jang from the Georgia Institute of Technology sheds light on the inalienable constituents of the Mactans attack from a more profound technical perspective. Starting with an overview of the provisioning profile features, the researcher also covers the methodology for obtaining the provisioning profile on the to-be compromised iOS device. Next goes the analysis of how an arbitrary hidden app can be installed, what should be done to obfuscate its execution, and how a private API can be exploited.
Billy Lau and his colleague Yeongjin Jang move on with the description of their research, dwelling on the details of Mactans compromising iDevices. In particular, the hardware architecture and other essential properties of the tricky charger are provided, and the algorithm of the attack workflow gets revealed. The process of pairing with the target device and some probable issues that may occur along the way are covered herein as well.
This tutorial highlights a variety of nuances associated with the Rvzr-a.akamaihd.net adware program on computers running Mac OS. You will learn how this annoying infection tends to get on Macs, what ad campaign it’s part of, and how it manifests itself on an infected machine. Another essential part of this article is dedicated to the methods applicable for Rvzr-a.akamaihd.net removal for Mac.
Researchers from the Georgia Institute of Technology deliver a remarkable presentation at the Black Hat conference, highlighting iOS security essentials and an unprecedented proof-of-concept attack that they came up with. In particular, the study provides a non-trivial perspective of how the so-called ‘walled garden model’ is implemented, with its strong points as well as shortcomings. Importantly, the Mactans concept is also overviewed in this presentation, describing the process of attacking iDevices via an especially designed charger.
The blend of online protection, sensitive data guards, anti-theft, powerful optimization features and dedicated customer support makes this suite a nearly perfect match for the average Mac user when it comes to keeping the machine safe and performing at its peak.
In the final part of the Hack in the Box presentation, experts from Azimuth Security Mark Dowd and Tarjei Mandt analyze heap overflows as a component of iOS 6 kernel attack vectors. In particular, they dissect and exemplify a number of primitives, namely adjacent disclosure, arbitrary memory disclosure, extended overflow, and a mix of these techniques. The section also encompasses main takeaways relating to iOS 6 security.